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Another weakness was the provisions relating to payments to the Iranian government. The royalty, set at 4 shillings (gold) per tonne of oil, did not take into account the possible rise in oil prices, but was a hedge against a fall in prices. Indeed, fixed payments instead of tax have also been very low and have not focused on rising oil prices, nor on increasing AIOC`s profits, nor on possible changes to Iran`s income tax legislation. In addition, Iran`s 20% share of world profit was to be calculated on the basis of the distribution of dividends to ordinary shareholders and therefore depended on the policies and decisions of the oil company and the British government. In addition, Iran`s share was influenced by the level of profits decided by the AIOC for distribution, by the increase in the British government`s tax rates, by the restrictions imposed by the British government on dividends during the war and post-war years, as well as by the company`s policy of investing a significant part of its income in global activities. However, a minimum annual payment of £750,000 (USD 3,225,000) was guaranteed. Despite the aforementioned shortcomings, the terms of the 1933 agreement were significantly better than those of the D`Arcy concession and there were no known concession agreements at that time with better terms, especially since Iran is not giving up its title in all of APOC`s oil activities worldwide. To this end, it is interesting to mention what Cadman said afterwards: “I felt that we had been rather well plundered” (Yergin, p. 271). Many Iranians accuse Western nations of supporting the fall of the Shah because he did not renew the unionized agreement of 1979 in the so-called conspiracy theory of the 1979 Iranian revolution. [6] According to the New York Times, the oil companies argued, through a spokesman, that the Shah did not have the legal right to terminate his contract in 1979 because Iran had the choice to extend it for 15 years. [7] The sales contract.

Apart from the fact that the 1954 agreement did not achieve the main objective of the 1951 oil nationalization, namely the complete control and management of the oil industry by the niOC, the agreement had many weaknesses and shortcomings, many of which were inevitable due to serious economic problems in the country, the weakness of Iran`s negotiating position. and prevailing guidelines and practices in the international oil sector. In early 1973, the NIOC issued an ultimatum to the oil consortium that Iran would not extend the 1954 oil deal beyond 1979 (the initial 25 years) if no new agreement was reached and the consortium members would then be treated as ordinary buyers of Iranian oil. Under the circumstances, the consortium members opted for a new deal to become preferred customers of Iranian oil, in exchange for giving up the management and control of the oil industry in the contract zone. As a result, on 19 July 1973 (with retroactive effect from 21 March 1973), a 20-year contract of sale was signed between the parties, replacing the 1954 oil contract. 1. Under the control of NIOC, the contractor would only be responsible for carrying out exploration work in the contract area. Agreement sirip. This agreement was marked on the model of the mixed organization, which created a new legal unit SIRIP (Iranian-Italian Petroleum Company), with equal participation of NIOC and AGIP Mineraria. The agreement consisted of three distinct areas: an area of the continental shelf in the northern part of the Persian Gulf; a continental area in the region of the eastern slopes of the central Zagros Mountains; and an area along the coast of the Gulf of Oman….